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Abstract
Social networks have an important and possibly key role in our 
society today. In addition to the benefits, serious privacy concerns 
also emerge: there are algorithms called de-anonymization 
attacks that are capable of re-identifying large fractions of 
anonymously published networks. A strong class of these attacks 
solely use the network structure to achieve their goals. In this 
paper we propose a novel structural de-anonymization attack 
called Grasshopper. By measurements we compare Grasshopper 
to the state-of-the-art algorithm, and highlight its enhanced 
capabilities, such as having negligible error rates and accessing 
yield levels that was not possible before: in cases when there 
is greater noise in the background knowledge. We furthermore 
evaluate an anonymity measure for the Grasshopper algorithm 
which enables the approximate ranking of nodes according 
to their re-identification rates. Finally, we characterize the 
robustness of Grasshopper in tackling identity separation, a 
privacy-enhancing technique that facilitate hiding of structural 
information.
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1 Introduction
Most of social networking services provide interfaces for 
managing social relationships, while others focus on enabling 
the collaboration of their users. A useful feature of these ser-
vices is that they are supported by an underlying (and occa-
sionally only implicitly existing) graph structure. However, 
beside the values these services give to humanity, social media 
also serves as an optimal platform for all kinds of surveillance 
activities, as members can snoop upon each other, commercial 
parties can access vast amounts of private data, and as recent 
events confirm [4], government surveillance is also present as 
well. Therefore it is crucial to investigate privacy issues beyond 
the use of related settings.
In this paper we consider how the graph structure can be 
abused to violate user privacy. There are several ways to access 
anonymized datasets, for example, someone can obtain such a 
dataset that was previously released for business or research 
purposes. While such a dataset should contain private attributes 
without explicit identifiers, a malicious third party can try to 
re-identify nodes by using their relationships. In case of success, 
the private information could be used (and monetized) with real 
identities. The basic idea for performing this type of attack is 
to use structural data from another social network to execute 
an iterative re-identification algorithm. Despite the difficult 
nature of the problem, several attacks have been published 
recently that are able to breach user privacy at large-scale even 
in networks having hundreds of thousands of nodes [21].
Let us now illustrate how these attacks work on a simple 
example. An adversary obtains datasets as depicted on Fig. 1a 
(background knowledge) and Fig. 1b (sanitized dataset), wish-
ing to learn an otherwise inaccessible private attribute by struc-
tural de-annymization: who is a democrat or republican voter in 
the public network. Initially, the attacker re-identifies (or maps) 
νDave ↔ ν3  and νFred ↔ ν2  as they have globally the highest 
matching degree values in both networks. Then he continues 
with local re-identification by inspecting nodes related to the 
ones already re-identified. Therefore, he picks νEd , who is the 
highest degree common neighbor of (νDave , νFred ), and then it is 
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mapped as νEd ↔ ν7 , as ν7 is the only node neighboring ν2 ,ν3, 
and have a degree of 3. This simple algorithm can continue iter-
ating through unmapped nodes, resulting in discovering further 
possible mappings (e.g., νHarry ↔ ν1 , νCarol ↔ ν6 ).
Fig. 1. Datasets for the example of de-anonymization.
In this work, we propose a novel structural re-identification 
algorithm called Grasshopper. Besides providing the analysis 
of this attack, we also consider its robustness versus a privacy-
enhancing method related to the identity partitioning technique 
[7,16,28,29], called identity separation. Identity separation 
allows a user to have multiple unlinkable profiles in the same 
network, which results in multiple unlinkable nodes in sani-
tized graphs also (i.e., as the service provider should also be 
unaware of the link between the identities). This could be imag-
ined as a feature of having multiple registrations in parallel, 
where the ease of use is provided by software. Our simulation 
evaluation provides the model level analysis of identity separa-
tion in tackling the Grasshopper algorithm. Designing a system 
that supports identity separation in a private way is possible 
and feasible, and could benefit our work by incorporating use-
ful strategies; however, it is a complex task, the detailed elabo-
ration of such a system is beyond the scope of the current work. 
Our main contributions in this paper are the following:
• We propose a novel structural re-identification algorithm 
called Grasshopper. We experimentally show that Grass-
hopper can achieve significantly higher correct re-iden-
tification rates when the background knowledge of the 
attacker is noisy, what was not possible with the state-
of-the-art attack Nar09 [21]. In addition, we show that 
Grasshopper has some significantly improved properties 
compared to Nar09: in our experiments we observed neg-
ligibly small error rates, and found that Grasshopper can 
be initialized with only a small fraction of nodes that was 
required for Nar09. 
• We evaluate two anonymity measures for Grasshopper. Our 
findings show that the values produced by these measure 
have a strong correlation with re-identification rates (typi-
cally around 0.6 − 0.8), and thus can be used to rank the 
nodes within the network to assess their level of anonymity. 
• We characterize the robustness of the Grasshopper attack 
against identity separation. In particular, we evaluate two 
series of experiments on non-cooperative and cooperative 
identity separation. We show that non-cooperative strate-
gies are practically ineffective in stopping the attack, but 
allow adopters of identity separation to minimize data 
leakage. We show that if cooperation can be organized, 
such settings can effectively preserve network privacy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss 
related work, and in Section 3, we provide the methodology of 
our evaluation. Section 4 provides the details of the Grasshopper 
algorithm, and in Section 5, we compare significant properties 
of our algorithm to the ones of the state-of-the-art attack, Nar09. 
In Section 6, we evaluate anonymity measures for Grasshopper. 
Identity separation, a potential tool for enhancing privacy against 
structural re-identification is evaluated against Grasshopper in 
Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude our work.
2 Related Work
2.1 Large-Scale De-anonymization Attacks
The algorithm proposed by Narayanan and Shmatikov in 
2009 (Nar09) had a significant novelty compared to the lit-
erature discussed so far: it applied local comparison of nodes 
based on previously discovered matching of neighboring nodes 
[21]. The Nar09 algorithm aims to reveal the identities of nodes 
within a sanitized graph (the target graph) by using a social net-
work obtained from an auxiliary source (the source graph). The 
authors in their main experiment re-identified 30.8 % of nodes 
being mutually present in a Twitter and a Flickr crawl with a 
relatively low error rate of 12.1 %. 
Works following their approach also used a similar proce-
dure; in most cases these consist of an initialization phase (or 
seed phase), which is then followed by a propagation phase. In 
general, the seeding identifies a small set of globally outstand-
ing nodes, and then the propagation phase extends this set, for 
instance, by searching locally outstanding nodes that are con-
nected to the set of already re-identified ones. These phases can 
also be named as global and local re-identification phases. 
In their original experiment, the seeding is based on 
4-cliques. The steps of the propagation phase are iterated on 
the neighbors of the nodes already re-identified until new 
matchings can be discovered (i.e., it continuously extends the 
seed set). Identified nodes are also revisited. In each iteration, 
candidates are selected from target graph nodes, which share at 
least a common mapped neighbor with the source node being 
re-identified. Target candidates are then compared by scoring 
their similarity to the source node. If there is an outstanding 
candidate, the source and target graphs are exchanged, and a 
reverse checking is executed in order to verify the proposed 
mapping. If the result of reverse checking equals the source 
node, this is accepted as a valid mapping. 
(a) Public network (as auxiliary data) (b) Anonymized network
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Narayanan et al. in 2011 presented another variant of their 
attack [20] specialized for the task of working on two snapshots 
of the same network, that could achieve a higher recall rate. 
Another proposal of Wei et al. [23] challenged Nar09; however, 
their attack is only evaluated against a light edge perturbation 
procedure, instead of the more realistic one proposed in [21]. The 
latter deletes both nodes and edges from both networks (result-
ing overlaps can be as low as 25 %), while in [23] perturbation 
only adds edges to the target network (up to 3 %) without any 
deletion. For a more comprehensive evaluation, their algorithms 
need to be compared with a perturbation method that includes 
deletion. In addition, experiments in [23] are performed on two 
small graphs consisting only of handful of nodes (graph vertex 
sizes are 125 and 600) – if it is feasible for the seed-and-grow 
algorithm, a comparison on larger datasets need to be done.
Pedarsani et al. proposed a novel type of attack that can 
work without any initial input such as seeds [22]. Their design 
incorporated seeding into the propagation phase, as the initial 
propagation step starts identifying top degree nodes according 
to a given node fingerprint measure. However, their algorithm 
requires very high similarity between the source and target 
datasets (e.g., α
ν
 = 1.0 and αe = 0.85; for explanation, see Sec-
tion 3.2), which is hard to meet in many cases. Additionally, 
their work was experimentally tested only on a single, small 
network with 2024 nodes and 25,603 edges.
Danezis and Sharad presented a generic deanonymization 
framework for the evaluation of anonymization schemes [25], 
which can be trained on a relatively small set of sanitized data. 
While their results can not be directly compared to global 
matching algorithms such as [21], their framework can be used 
for testing new sanitization schemes, such as identity separa-
tion (as future work).
It has been shown that even a relatively small amount of 
mobility data can easily identify users [19], and even short 
periods of surveillance enable identification [9]. However, 
it was first shown by Srivatsa and Hicks that location traces 
can also be re-identified with similar methods what was used 
for social networks [27]. In their work on small datasets (125 
nodes and below), they succeeded in identifying circa. 80 % of 
users by building anonymous networks of location traces, and 
using explicit social networks for de-anonymization. 
The work of Pham et al. showed that the ability of algorithms 
using spatiotemporal data for making social network connec-
tions, can be extended to large datasets [24]. Building upon 
their work, Ji et al. showed that spatiotemporal data at the scale 
of hundred thousand entities can be easily re-identified [18]: 
first a social network is generated based on the inspection of 
co-occurrences in the spatio-temporal dataset, then it is re-
identified by using a social network as auxiliary data.
As none of the attacks discussed here have been proven to 
be better in general (e.g., always have higher correct re-identi-
fication rates under the same circumstances) than the algorithm 
proposed by Narayanan and Shmatikov in [21] (e.g., due to 
lack of comparative experiments on large networks), we con-
sidered the Nar09 algorithm as the state-of-the-art attack at the 
time of evaluation Grasshopper.
2.2 Enhancing Privacy Contra De-anonymization
We consider user centered privacy protection mechanisms 
for preventing de-anonymization, ones that can be adopted in 
existing services (instead of graph sanitization applied by the 
service provider). For instance, Scramble is a good example for 
solutions being independent of the service provider and allow-
ing a fine-grained access of social data [6]. Otherwise, one 
might consider using revised service models, such as distrib-
uted social networks like Safebook [8]; however, these services 
are more difficult to introduce.
Beato et al. proposed the friend-in-the-middle model, where 
proxy-like nodes serve as mediators to hide connections, ena-
bling to repel the attack on a network level [5]. Their concept 
could be also implemented as an external tool that could be 
used in existing social networking services. The viability of 
the FiM model is presented (successfully) on two snapshots of 
the Slashdot network [3] (which we also used; for more details 
see Section 3). However, identity separation allows more than 
hiding connections, even hiding profile information beside 
relationships [7]. As this allows finer-grained management of 
information, with less cooperation – this can even enable the 
protection of a single individual.
The concept of privacy-enhancing identity management 
was developed in details within the framework of the PRIME 
Project [17], including how identity partitioning and separa-
tion could be implemented in various contexts and services. 
The possible use of identity separation in social networks was 
introduced by us in [16], where we proposed a modified social 
network model with a non-flat structure. The works of van den 
Berg and Leenes in [28,29] provided further details on identity 
partitioning, especially focusing on access control and division 
of information shared.
Previously, we have analytically showed that identity sepa-
ration is an effective tool against clique based seeding mecha-
nisms [11]. In subsequent works, we analyzed the protective 
strength of identity separation against the propagation phase 
of Nar09 [13,15] with simulation on datasets obtained from 
three different social networks. In [13] we analyzed the non-
cooperative setting, and we have shown that while almost half 
of the users are required to repel the attack (and retain net-
work privacy), it is possible to effectively hide information 
from the attacker even for a few nodes if the proper settings 
are applied. In [15] we analyzed the cooperative setting organ-
ized accordingly to the importance of nodes, based on their 
anonymity values. The minimum number of required nodes to 
repel the attack dropped down to the fraction measured in the 
non-cooperative case.
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In cases when a node is identified globally in a network, it 
is trivial (but likely costly) to measure its anonymity level, 
which usually proportional to the number of nodes with the 
same fingerprint, i.e., number of nodes being in the same 
anonymity set. However, in case of attacks like Nar09, nodes 
are compared locally, and therefore anonymity sets can not 
be considered in the same sense. Furthermore, without know-
ing the background knowledge of the attacker, anonymity can 
be only estimated. To circumvent this problem we proposed 
local anonymity measures in [12]. These can be useful from a 
privacy-oriented point of view, as these can express the node’s 
resistance level against local re-identification techniques, and 
these can also support data providers and attackers to make 
estimates of the possible success of attacks.
We also proposed and evaluated multiple anonymity meas-
ure variants for the Nar09 attack. In the evaluation of [12], 
we measured an average Pearson correlation [1] of −0.4221 
between anonymity values and re-identification rates of nodes 
for the most outstanding anonymity measure variant, denoted 
as LTAA (details provided in Section 6.1). As this evaluation 
was done for networks sized at most ten thousand nodes, we 
provided further evaluation on larger networks in [15]. We 
evaluated LTAA in three networks having more than sixty thou-
sands of nodes, and observed a Spearman rank correlation [2] 
typically around −0.65. Besides, we observed also similarly 
strong correlation values for node degree, denoted as LTAdeg .
Finally, we have shown that seeding parameters are an impor-
tant aspect of the de-anonymization procedure, as they have 
a significant effect on the overall results [14]. Thus, it should 
be detailed both for comparing new attack schemes (e.g., [23]) 
and for evaluating protection mechanisms (e.g., [5,13]). There-
fore we analyzed our findings regarding this finding, too.
3 Notation and Method of Evaluation
3.1 Notation and Definitions
Given a sanitized graph Gtar (target graph) to be de-
anonymized by using an auxiliary data source Gsrc (where node 
identities are known), let  V V V Vsrc src tar tar⊆ , ⊆  denote the set of 
nodes mutually existing in both. Ground truth is represented by 
mapping µG src tarV V: →   denoting relationship between coex-
isting nodes. Let us denote a vertex set V as V' after having 
identity separation adopted (by some or all of its nodes). We 
denote the set of nodes before adopting identity separation as 
V Vids tar⊆ , and denote  V Vids tar⊆  the subset coexisting nodes; 
thus Vids
'  contains multiple identities of nodes from Vids . Let 
λG src idsV V:    denote the ground truth mappings between 
coexisting nodes in Gsrc and all their separated identities in Gtar. 
Running a deterministic re-identification attack on (Gsrc , Gtar ) 
initialized by seed set µ0 : →V Vsrc tar
'  results in a re-identifica-
tion mapping denoted as µ : →V Vsrc tar
' .
Furthermore, we denote the corresponding nodes in different 
networks as v Vn
src
src∈  and v Vn
tar
tar∈ . When identity separation 
of user v Vn
tar
ids∈  is committed, the user creates a total of y new 
partial identities which are denoted as v V i yn i ids\ , ,∈ ∈[ ]( ) …1 , 
and then distribute edges between new identities. It is assumed 
that the attacker only captures the sanitized dataset after the 
user committed identity separation, and knows no information 
about the identity separation process itself. 
We use two measures for assessing the extent of what the 
attacker could learn from μ. The recall rate reflects the extent 
of re-identification, describing success from an attacker point of 
view. This itself can be used due to small error rates. As identity 
separation is a personal information hiding tool, the quantity of 
information the attacker gained access to should also be con-
cerned, which is quantified by the disclosure rate. This describes 
an overall protection efficiency from a user point of view.
Now we can describe the mode of calculation of these 
rates. The recall rate is calculated by dividing the number 
of correct identifications with the number of mutually exist-
ing nodes (seeds are excluded from the results). The score of 
a node v Vsrc src∈   regarding a given re-identification mapping 
μ should quantify correct matches as 1 (including the mapping 
to a partial identity), and incorrect ones as −1. Therefore it can 
be expressed as:
s v
v
v v v vsrc
src
src
G
src src
G
src( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), = = ∨ ∈
−
µ
µ
µ µ µ λ
0
1
if
if

1 if µ µ µ λ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v v v vsrc G
src src
G
src≠ ∧ /∈





.
We can now quantify the recall rate of an attack resulting in 
mapping μ can be calculated as
R s v s v
Vv V
src src
srcsrc src
( ) ( ) ( ( ))µ µ µ= , ⋅ , ,
| |
.
∀ ∈
∑


max 0
The disclosure rate can be calculated in a similar manner. 
As current identity separation models are bond to structural 
information, the measure reflects the average percent of edges 
that the attacker successfully revealed. This represents the 
ratio of information leakage in the current scenario, and can be 
extended for further types of information in other experiments, 
e.g., sensitive profile attributes. The disclosed information can 
be quantified for an individual node v Vn
tar
ids∈   as 
d v
deg v
deg v
v v v v
n
tar
n i
n
tar n
src
n i n i G n
s
( )
( )
( )
( ) (\ \ \, =
∃ = ∧ ∈
µ
µ λif rc )
0 otherwise




.
By using this function we can now define the disclosure rate 
of the attacker over the nodes applying identity separation w.r.t. 
mapping μ as
D d v
Vv V
n
tar
idsn
tar
ids
( ) ( )µ µ= , .
∀ ∈
∑


(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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The re-identification rate of a node v in a series of experi-
ments ν is considered in some cases, which is calculated as 
S v s v( ) ( )= , ,
∀ ∈
∑
µ ν
µ
where s(v, μ) can theoretically take arbitrary values in the 
series of ν.
3.2 Social Network Datasets and Perturbation
During our experiments we used multiple datasets with dif-
ferent characteristics in order to avoid related biases. In addi-
tion, we used large networks, as brute-force attacks can be 
mounted against smaller ones. We obtained two datasets from 
the SNAP collection [3], namely the Slashdot network crawled 
in 2009 (82,168 nodes, 504,230 edges) and the Epinions net-
work crawled in 2002 (75,879 nodes, 405,740 edges). The third 
dataset is a subgraph exported from the LiveJournal network 
crawled in 2010 (at our dept.; consisting of 66,752 nodes, 
619,512 edges). All datasets were obtained from real networks 
in order to maintain our measurements being realistic. 
In order to generate the test data, first we derived a back-
ground knowledge (Gsrc ) and a target graph (Gtar ), having 
desired overlap of nodes and edges, and then modeled identity 
separation on a subset of nodes in the target graph. For the first 
part, we used the perturbation strategy proposed by Narayanan 
and Shmatikov [21], as we found their method to be produc-
ing fairly realistic test data. Their algorithm takes the initial 
graph to derive Gsrc , Gtar with the desired fraction of overlap-
ping nodes (α
ν ), and then edges are deleted independently from 
the copies to achieve edge overlap αe . By knowing the original 
graph, the ground truth μG can be easily created at this point.
We found α
ν
 = 0.5, αe = 0.75 to be a good trade-off at which 
a significant level of uncertainty is present in the data (thus 
life-like), but the Nar09 attack is still capable of identifying 
a large ratio of the co-existing nodes. Fraction of correctly 
identified nodes are presented for various settings in all the 
test network in Table 1.
Due to the lack of real-world data, we used the probabil-
ity based models we previously introduced in [11] for deriving 
test data from real-world datasets featuring identity separation 
(these models were also used in [13,15]). These models capture 
identity separation as splitting a node, and assigning previously 
existing edges to the new nodes. The number of new identities 
is modeled with a random variable Y (with no bounds on dis-
tribution), which we either set to a fixed value,or model it with 
a random variable having a power-law-like distribution. In our 
work it is assumed, that the identity separation is done in secret, 
and can not be learned by the attacker from auxiliary sources.
For edge sorting, there are four models in [11] regarding 
whether it is allowed to delete (i.e., an edge becomes private) or 
to duplicate edges, from which we used three in our experiments. 
The basic model is simple and easy to work with, as it consists 
a simple redistribution of edges between the new identities (no 
edge deletion or duplication allowed). In order to represent pri-
vacy-oriented user behavior, we also used the best model, where 
no edge duplication is allowed, but edges can be deleted.
Identity separation is then modeled on the target graph by 
uniformly sampling a given percent of nodes with at least 
deg(ν) = 2 (this ratio is maintained for the ground truth nodes), 
and then nodes are split and their edges are sorted according to 
the settings of the currently used model. This results in extend-
ing the ground truth mapping μG with λG by recording identity 
separation operations.
3.3 Calibrating Simulations
By comparing the directed and undirected versions of Nar09, 
we found little difference in results. Therefore, due to this rea-
son and for sake of simplicity, in our experiments we used 
undirected networks. Additionally, in each experiment we cre-
ated two random perturbations, and run simulations two times 
on both with a different seed set (unless different settings are 
noted). We observed only minor deviations in results, usually 
less than a percent.
Probably the most important parameter of Nar09 is Θ, con-
trolling the ratio of true positives (recall rate) and false posi-
tives (error rate). The lower Θ is the less accurate mappings 
the algorithm will accept. As we measured fairly low error 
rates even for small values of Θ, we have chosen to work with
Θ = 0.01. In the majority of experiments the ground truth error 
rate (later referred as the error rate) stayed typically around a 
few percents. The overall error was around 5% without identity 
separation, and decreased significantly when identity separa-
tion was applied.
Another important property of the simulation the seeding 
method and size. In our previous work in [15] we provided 
details for various methods, and showed that the overall recall 
rate is influenced by several properties of seed nodes, such as 
the structural relation between them (e.g., cliquish structure or 
neighboring), and their global properties (e.g., node degree, 
betweenness centrality score). Results are also shown to be 
dependent on network size and structure. Our experiments 
highlighted seeding methods that were top performers on the 
large networks, regardless of network structure (e.g., nodes 
with highest degree and betweenness centrality scores).
Regarding these results, for simulating an attacker, we 
applied random seed selection with high degree nodes, where 
nodes are selected from the top 25% by degree (denoted as 
random.25). Seed set size was selected constantly for a thou-
sand nodes, as this proved to be robust in all networks [14]. 
For the simulation of stronger attackers top degree nodes were 
selected as seeds (denoted as top), as this methods proved to 
be one of the most effective in our datasets [14].
(5)
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4 The Grasshopper Algorithm
In this section we present the Grasshopper algorithm, that 
we developed based on the idea of the first author. Grasshop-
per have many similarities that resemble the Nar09 algorithm 
[21], however, there are also significant differences that need 
to be emphasized. The broad outline of Grasshopper is the 
same to Nar09: there is a propagation step that is iterated on 
the mapping between the two graphs until new mappings are 
registered. In each iteration, a node is selected and if there is 
an appropriate target candidate for mapping it, this is reversely 
checked. If the proposed mapping for the target candidate is 
the original node, the new mapping is accepted. Looking at the 
algorithms with a greater granularity level, differences emerge. 
The pseudo code of Grasshopper is presented in Algorithm 1, 
and now we present important features of Grasshopper.
Weighting mappings and scoring. We introduced a 
weighting scheme that is applied on existing mappings and 
denoted as ω. Nar09 used each existing mapping in μ with 
the same weight (i.e., 1.0), while we weight each mapping 
proportionally to number of mappings in their neighborhood. 
The intuition here is that mappings linking nodes having a 
significant number of mappings in their neighborhood should be 
considered as more valuable and are likely to be more accurate 
than others. We use ω in the scoring part (in the BestMatch 
function) instead of using the same score for each mapping.
Updating the mapping only once per iteration. The mapping 
μ is copied into η in each iteration step (could be interpreted as 
’subsequent mappings’), and only η is updated during the propa-
gation step; thus, new mappings are only considered in the next 
round. We note that this feature is not an absolute necessity, and 
turning it off leads to the greedy variant of the Grasshopper algo-
rithm. This is slightly faster, but properties are less improved, 
e.g., there is a slight increase in the number of required seeds. For 
achieving the best results, we worked with the non-greedy setting.
Convergence criteria. Propagation is iterated while there 
is convergence in the results: new and important mappings are 
added in the propagation step. The Nar09 algorithm uses a sim-
ilar criteria, and we found that it has a rather slow convergence: 
most mappings are found in the first few propagation steps, 
while there might be even tens of subsequent steps following 
when only a few new mappings are registered in each. This 
phenomena can also be observed in Grasshopper, however, 
the convergenceis even slower. In order to rationalize our time 
needs, we stopped convergence if it reached 40 steps or run for 
more than 20 mins. These settings can be easily re-adjusted in 
other experiments (we found these to leading only negligible 
losses), and an attacker can simply ignore them to have the best 
results. In our future work we intend to introduce a mapping 
memory to find an improved convergence criteria. 
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code of the Grasshopper propagation phase.
Require: Θ  Threshold for accepting new matches.
1:  function ProPagate(Gsrc , Gtar , μ)
2:       μ ← μ0
3:       repeat
4: (μ,Δ) ← ProPagatesteP (Gsrc , Gtar , μ)
5:       until Δ = 0
6:  end function
7:
8:  function ProPagate(Gsrc , Gtar , μ0)
9:       Δ ← 0
10:    ωsrc src src srcv V v← ∀ ∈ →{ }: .1 0  Initialize weights.
11:    ωtar tar tar tarv V v← ∀ ∈ →{ }: .1 0
12:     for all v Vsrc src∈  if ∃µ( )vsrc  do
13: for all v G vsrc src src' ( )∈ .NBRS  do
14:      if ∃ ∈ .µ µ( ) ( ( ))'v G vsrc tar srcNBRS  then
15:           α µ← . ∗ .( )SQRT DEGREE DEGREEv vsrc src() ( ) ()
16:           ω ω αsrc src src srcv v[ ] [ ] .← +1 0
17:           ω µ ω µ αtar src tar srcv v[ ( )] [ ( )] .← +1 0
18:      end if
19: end for
20:     end for
21:     η = μ
22:     for all v Vsrc src∈  do Seek new possible matches.
23: νtc ← BestMatch(Gsrc , Gtar , ωtar , νsrc , μ)
24: if νtc ≠ None then
25:      νsc ← BestMatch(Gtar , Gsrc , ωsrc , νtc , μ
−1)
26:      if νsc = νsrc  and  (µ vsrc( ) or ∃ ≠µ( )v vsrc tc ) then
27:           η [νsrc ] ← νtc
28:           Δ ← Δ +1
29:      end if
30: end if
31:     end for
32:     μ = η
33:     return (μ, Δ)
34:  end function
35:
36:  function BestMatch(Gsrc , Gtar , ω , νi , μ)
37:     S ← { }
38:     for all v G vi src i' ( )∈ .NBRS   if  ∃µ( )'vi   do
39: for all v G vj tar i' '∈ . ( )( )NBRS µ   do
40:      if v j' /∈  S.keys( ) then
41:  S v j'  ← 0
42:      end if
43:      S v S v vj j j' ' '  ←   +  ω
44: end for
45:     end for
46:     if  S.size( ) = 0  then
47: return  None
48:     end if
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49:     if eccentricity (S.values( ) ) ≥ Θ  then
50: νc ← Pick (∀ ∈v  S.keys( ) : S[ν] = max (S.values( )))
51: return νc
52:     end if
53:     return None
54:  end function
55:
56:  function  eccentricity (S)
57:     return (max(S) − max2(S)) / σ(S)
58:  end function
5 General Evaluation
In this section we evaluate basic properties of the Grasshop-
per algorithm, and compare results to the the state-of-the-art 
attack, Nar09.
5.1 Characterizing Basic Properties
Parameter Θ has a vital role in both Nar09 and the 
Grasshopper algorithms, as the best matching node is evaluated 
respecting Θ: it determines how outstanding a node should 
be to be accepted. In other words, this parameter controls 
the trade-off regarding the proportion of accurate and false 
matches. We measured the effect of Θ with several values, by 
using random.25 seeding method. For Nar09 we used 1000 
seeds and for Grasshopper we used 100, as these turned out to 
be stable for each (see related measurements below).
Our results are shown in Fig. 2, which tells two important 
findings. First, Grasshopper could achieve recall rates that was 
not possible with Nar09. However, this is not true in general, but 
in some cases the difference is quite significant (recall rates for 
multiple networks are depicted on Fig. 3a). Second, which is a 
general improvement, the error rate is only a fraction compared 
to the Nar09. This means that parameter Θ has a less significant 
role in the algorithm, and matches produced by Grasshopper 
can be accepted unconditionally as the error rate is very small. 
For example, the LJ66k network showed on the figure had the 
highest error rates in our experiments (1.16% and decreasing), 
while in other networks it was well below 0.38%. 
In our previous work [14], we showed that the seeding 
method should be carefully chosen for the given network. 
Here, we have measured the differences in the transition phase 
of Grasshopper (i.e., minimum number of seeding to have sta-
ble large-scale propagation) compared to Nar09; our results are 
summarized on Fig. 3a. It turned out that Grasshopper needs 
only a fraction of seeds compared to Nar09. In our experiments 
just a small set of 20 random.25 seeds proved to be enough 
to have stable large-scale propagation. Even the lowest value 
was at 200 for Nar09.
Subsequently, we measured the minimum number of top 
degree nodes (top) that Grasshopper require for initialization 
Tab. 1. Recall rates measured on the same datasets by both algorithms. We highlighted results when R(μ) > 10% and difference was at least with 2%: green marks 
where Grasshopper was better, and red where Nar09 provided better results. In general, we observed that results depended on the scale of perturbation; Grasshopper 
provided better results when overlap was smaller and more noisy.
    Slashdot Epinions LJ66k 
    αe αe αe
  αv↓ 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0  
N
ar
09
0.25 0.64 2.48 11.74 19.81 1.07 5.11 10.95 14.80 0.79 6.47 19.61 27.83  
0.5 0.47 19.88 36.60 47.58 0.95 17.15 25.90 32.73 0.72 24.75 35.83 54.55  
0.75 0.40 28.71 50.78 60.43 0.62 25.39 36.12 44.42 0.86 33.97 58.21 78.90  
1.0 0.35 15.53 58.94 68.36 0.45 31.19 43.25 52.60 1.82 37.85 75.28 88.54  
G
rh
0.25 0.18 14.83 23.36 28.02 0.26 7.80 14.90 17.84 0.11 14.75 25.75 33.28  
0.5 0.31 26.81 35.33 39.34 0.38 15.82 21.05 24.65 0.16 27.98 46.16 57.45  
0.75 6.18 33.26 40.47 44.10 2.83 18.78 24.22 28.46 0.25 35.64 58.40 68.20  
1.0 20.41 36.71 42.91 46.88 10.73 20.70 25.87 30.30 12.43 49.20 65.35 73.48  
Fig. 2. Measurements for different values of the Θ parameter.
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(see Fig. 3b). For the Nar09 algorithm, in previous work [14], we 
measured this to be 60-85, depending on the network, while cur-
rent measurements confirmed these numbers to be significantly 
lower for Grasshopper. For example, there were cases when the 
Slashdot network could be re-identified by only mapping 6 top 
degree nodes initially R(μ) = 17.7% means that large-scale propa-
gation could be started in one of the perturbed datasets).
5.2 Recall and Error Rates
We measured recall rates for different settings of perturba-
tion, where α
ν
 and αe varied as α αv e, ∈ . , . , . , .{ }0 25 0 5 0 75 1 0 , and 
our results are summarized in Table 1. We highlighted cases 
when results differed at least with 2% assuming also R(μ) > 
10%. In all networks results depended on the scale of perturba-
tion. When the overlap, thus similarity was high between Gsrc 
and Gtar , Nar09 provided better results; while in cases with a 
lower similarity Grasshopper could achieve larger recall rates. 
However, we observed slightly worse results in the Epin-
ions dataset. Possibly this is due to structural differences: in the 
Epinions dataset the majority of the nodes (almost 70%) have 
a degree of deg(ν) ≤ 3, while this is 58.8% in the Slashdot and 
33.9% in the LJ66k network. This difference needs to be inves-
tigated in future work. Making decisions on which algorithm 
should be used is possible, as according to recent results, an 
adversary can estimate the overlap between the background and 
target datasets [10]. However, in general, having a lower over-
lap between the target dataset and background knowledge is a 
more realistic scenario, making the results of Grasshopper more 
relevant. We have additionally provided matching error rates on 
Fig. 4. Error rates for the Grasshopper algorithm were so low 
that these can be simply disregarded when executing an attack.
Fig. 4. Error rates for the Grasshopper algorithm was significantly lower than 
in the Nar09 algorithm. In fact, erroneous mappings could be simply disregarded 
when executing an attack.
6 Measuring Anonymity
In this section we evaluate two anonymity measures that 
proved to be the most efficient in the evaluation of anonymity 
measures for the Nar09 algorithm [15].
6.1 Local Topological Anonymity:
Definition and Variants
Large-scale structural re-identification attacks compare nodes 
against their 2-neighborhoods in their local re-identification (or 
propagation) phase, therefore, the more similar a node is to its 
neighborhood, the lower chance it has for being re-identified. 
It is important to capture this property by anonymity measures. 
Our approach for measuring anonymity is called Local Topo-
logical Anonymity (LTA), and we defined LTA [12] as follows:
Fig. 3. Seeding properties characterized and compared for Nar09 and Grasshopper.
(a) Grasshopper required a fraction of seeds compared to Nar09; in all cases 
only 20 seeds were enough to have stable large-scale propagation. Furthermore, 
Grasshopper can achieve signicantly larger recall rates in some cases, like in the 
LJ66k network displayed on the figure.
(b) Grasshopper can be initialized successfully with only a handful of top 
nodes as seeds, e.g., 6 nodes was enough in the Slashdot network (unstable). 
Even in case of a background knowledge having a lower overlap with sanitized 
data, such a number of top seeds are likely to be identiable. For comparison, 
we measured this to be 60-85 for the Nar09 algorithm [14] (depending on the 
network) when having exactly the same settings.
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Definition 1 A Local Topological Anonymity measure is a 
function, denoted as LTA(∙), which represents the hiding ability 
of a node in a social network graph against attacks consider-
ing solely the structural properties of the node limited to its 
d-neighborhood 1.
Based on this definition, we can introduce LTA variants that 
are tailored for some specific attacks, e.g., LTAα : ∈ ,( ) .v G G 
These variants may have different ways of calculation or 
depend on different measures of similarity. The similarity func-
tion depends on the node fingerprinting function that the given 
attacks rely on. For example, Nar09 (and also the algorithm 
proposed in [20]) simply compares the sets of neighbors of 
nodes (of Gsrc ) to the neighbors of their friends-of-friends (in 
Gtar ) by using cosine similarity
2.
Due to this reason, and that other evaluation also found 
cosine similarity to have best results in similar applications 
[26], we proposed multiple LTA variants based on cosine simi-
larity in [12]. Both the evaluation in small [12] and large net-
works [15] showed that the variant labeled as LTAA is the most 
appropriate for measuring anonymity for Nar09. 
This variant specifies the average similarity of a node com-
pared to others in its 2-neighborhood (i.e., friends-of-friends), 
and calculated as follows: 
LTAA i
v V
i k
i
v CosSim v v
V
k i
( ) ( )= , .
∀ ∈
∑
2
2
As LTA measures are expected to indicate level of identifica-
tion, LTAA  does that: the lower the LTA value is, the higher the 
chances are that the node will be re-identified.
While evaluating Nar09, we found less than 20% of nodes 
with deg(ν) ≤ 3 were correctly re-identified, while this was 
around 80% for nodes with higher degree (approx. starting 
from deg(ν) ≤ 30). This and other signs advised that node 
degree can be also an appropriate measure of anonymity; 
evaluation in [15] confirmed this, as node degree is proved to 
be useful for apriori comparing re-identification rates between 
nodes. Thus, we could use node degree as an anonymity 
measure, denoted as:
LTA degdeg ( ) ( )v vi i= .
In case of LTAdeg(νi) assessment of node anonymity works 
differently compared to LTAA(νi): that the higher the node 
degree is, the higher the chance is that it can be de-anonymized, 
i.e., conversely than for LTAA.
6.2 Evaluation
For the correlation measurement here we used the Spearman’s 
rank correlation [2], as it is more important to see if an LTA 
metric correctly orders nodes in a decreasing or increasing order 
according to S(ν), rather than considering the exact difference 
between rankings. We measured the discussed variants on the 
same datasets we used for measuring recall rates in Section 5.2.
The results are shown on Fig. 5, where each dataset is dis-
tinguished by color and variants are plotted with different 
marker. As for our experiments both correlation values closer 
to 1.0 (ordered by decreasing anonymity) and to −1.0 (vice-
versa) are considered to be appropriate, we displayed the abso-
lute value of correlations.
Fig.  5. Measuring correlation between output of LTA variants and re-
identifications rates of Grasshopper on nodes. Recall clearly has a significant 
effect on this, however, the figure clearly shows that both evaluated variants 
had acceptable correlation rates.
Recall clearly has a significant effect on the correlation; how-
ever, the figure shows that both evaluated variants had accept-
able correlation rates, and LTAdeg had better results except for a 
few cases. In the evaluation of Nar09 and anonymity measures, 
it turned out that network structure determines which anonym-
ity measure should be used [15]. In the evaluation of Grasshop-
per, this could not be confirmed.
7 Characterizing Robustness of Identity
Separation for Grasshopper
Recall rates presented in Table 1 shows that Grasshopper 
provided equal or better results when the noise was higher 
between the background knowledge and the target dataset (at 
least for the Slashdot and LJ66k network). This fact makes the 
evaluation of identity separation interesting with the Grasshop-
per algorithm: is this novel algorithm more robust against this 
privacy-enhancing technique than Nar09? 
We analyze this issue from two main aspects, and we aim 
to provide comparable results with the evaluation provided in 
[15]; however, the provided results are also interesting when 
they are regarded on their own.
(6)
(7)
1 The following variants use d = 2, as this is a good trade-off between preci-
sion and computational requirements, and it is harmonized with typical network 
diameters.
2 CosSim v vi j
V V
V V
i j
i j
( ), = .∩
| |⋅| |
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7.1 Non-Cooperative Identity Separation
The non-cooperative setting includes applying the basic and 
best models (proposed in Section 3.2) to nodes without consid-
ering the relation between them or with other nodes in the net-
work. To experimentally measure how adoption rates influence 
the success of the attacker, we gradually increased the number of 
users applying identity separation (denoted with Vids ). On each 
generated dataset we run the algorithm with given settings, and 
measured recall rates; our results are shown on Fig. 6.
Regarding recall rates, Fig. 6a displays powerful robustness 
of the Grasshopper algorithm against identity separation. For the 
basic model when two identities are used, the attack is incredibly 
robust, the algorithm still capable of re-identifying a large frac-
tion of users even when 90% of the users adopt the technique! 
Compared with results measured for the Nar09 algorithm [15], 
this is a significant improvement from the attacker point of view. 
For Nar09, this is around 60 − 70% for the Epinions and Slashdot 
network, and 80 − 90% in the LJ66k dataset. 
Identity separation operates more efficiently when used with 
the best model Y = 5, yet 80% of the users need to participate 
to repel the de-anonymization attack (in [15] this is around 
50% for the Nar09 algorithm). While disclosure rates for the 
basic model stay also high almost regardless the adoption rate, 
results of the best model seem to be more promising: disclosure 
rates stay around 1% and below. We can conclude, that while 
non-cooperative identity separation was ineffective in tackling 
the Nar09 attack, it performs even worse against Grasshopper, 
but not for users aiming to protect themselves with the best 
model, Y = 5. In the latter cases user can effectively minimize 
possible information leakage.
We have also analyzed the effect of the seeding method on 
the overall recall rate of the propagation phase of Grasshopper, 
as this parameter is under the control of the attacker, and could 
be used to enhance results. Our measurements revealed (see 
example on Fig. 7) that seeding can not be used to significantly 
increase recall rates of the algorithm, but the number of seeds 
determine stability of the algorithm when the perturbation 
introduced by identity separation is high (e.g., | Vids | ≥ 0.9).
7.2 Global Cooperation for Identity Separation
There are several ways of organizing cooperative identity 
separation. In our evaluation, we choose to select nodes for 
cooperation that are globally important, where node impor-
tance can be measured from an adversarial point of view: nodes 
having a higher chance of re-identification should be selected 
first. Therefore, in our work we measure importance by adopt-
ing anonymity measures proposed in Section 6; namely LTAA  
and LTAdeg. This additionally allows comparison of our results 
to [15], where analysis is provided with LTAA based global 
cooperation on tackling Nar09. 
In two separate series of experiments we ranked nodes 
accordingly to their LTA scores and created perturbed datasets 
where first nodes having the lowest anonymity rankings were 
selected for for identity separation. Our results are shown for 
Fig. 6. The Grasshopper algorithm is quite robust against features of identity separation, in particular for the basic model with Y = 2, i.e., the attack could not be 
defeated even with | Vids | = 0.9. In case of the best model with Y = 5, Grasshopper can be defeated only with a very large fraction of participants; however, for the 
adopters of the technique user privacy is preserved in this case.
Fig. 7. Seeding showed to have only limited effects on overall results of the 
Grasshopper algorithm.
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each set of experiments for the LJ66k dataset on Fig. 8. Com-
pared to the results of non-cooperative case, we can observe 
some progress, as even in the worst case (LTAdeg , basic model, 
Y = 2) at most | Vids | = 0.26 proved to be enough for stopping 
the attack. Differences between results of LTAA  and LTAdeg are 
not outstanding, thus we can conclude that each method is fea-
sible for tackling the Grasshopper attack by using this strategy 
(results of LTAA is only subtly better).
Compared to the measurements provided in [15] for Nar09, 
Grasshopper proved to be more robust in the case of the basic 
model. Regarding the LJ66k dataset, for tackling Nar09 with 
nodes using the basic model, Y = 2 the minimum number of 
participants was | Vids | ~ 0.15, and | Vids | ~ 0.10 for the best 
model, Y = 5. This also means that maintaining network pri-
vacy with targeting nodes having a low anonymity level can be 
still a working strategy, if cooperation can be organized.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided the scheme of a novel structural 
re-identification attack called Grasshopper, and we experimen-
tally compared it to the state-of-the-art attack, called Nar09. 
We have shown that in a number of cases when the attacker 
knowledge is rather noisy, Grasshopper can achieve signifi-
cantly higher yield levels that was not possible with Nar09. It 
also turned out that while Grasshopper also has parameter Θ for 
controlling the trade-off between yield and accuracy, our algo-
rithm produces negligible error rates, typically around 1% and 
below. This is only a fraction that Nar09 produced under the 
same circumstances, meaning that matches proposed by Grass-
hopper are so low of error, all mappings could be accepted by 
an attacker without further filtering. Finally, we have shown 
that our algorithm can be initialized with the fraction of seed 
nodes compared to Nar09 to reach maximal re-identification. In 
all test networks 50 nodes selected from the top 25% by degree, 
or only 15 of top nodes proved to be sufficient, while these 
numbers were respectively around 750 and 85 for Nar09 (these 
measurements are provided in [14]). All these results prove that 
Grasshopper is a more suitable alternative when the goal is to 
have a low error in results, but also when the overlap between 
the sanitized and auxiliary datasets are low. 
Achieving higher recall rates for noisy background knowl-
edge is a sign of robustness. We also tested this by measuring 
how Grasshopper can defeat identity separation. It turned out 
that our algorithm is quite resistant to features of identity sepa-
ration. When we simulated users creating two new identities 
(basic model), the algorithm was still capable of re-identifying 
a large fraction of users even when 90% of the users adopted 
the technique! This is quite high, compared to the Nar09 algo-
rithm, where we measured this around 60 − 70% for the Epin-
ions and Slashdot networks, and 80 − 90% in the LJ66k data-
set in our previous work [15]. Even for a model with a higher 
number of identities and with edge deletion (best model, Y = 5) 
the required proportion of participant was around 80 − 90% to 
defeat Grasshopper. Fortunately, in this case, the attacker could 
learn only a little about nodes adopting the technique, high-
lighting the applicability of this identity separation strategy for 
protecting user privacy.
Finally, we have evaluated two anonymity measures that were 
originally proposed and evaluated for the Nar09 attack [15], and 
showed that these are also useful for Grasshopper, as a high cor-
relation was present in our experiments between the estimated 
level of anonymity and re-identification rates. Based on these 
measures, we have tested two global cooperation schemes, 
where nodes having a lower anonymity level were selected for 
adopting identity separation. While Grasshopper turned out to 
be more robust than Nar09 in this case (compared to results in 
[15]), it could not tackle users adopting the best model with Y = 
5 with significantly lower participation rates. We can conclude 
that using the best model (Y = 5) is a feasible privacy enhancing 
strategy that minimizes information disclosure also against the 
Grasshopper algorithm, and if network level cooperation can be 
organized, for protecting network privacy, too.
Fig. 8. Global cooperation can significantly decrease the minimum number of adopting users required for tackling Grasshopper.
(a) Global cooperation based on LTAA. (b) Global cooperation based on LTAdeg.
172 Period. Polytech. Elec. Eng. Comp. Sci. Benedek Simon / Gábor György Gulyás / Sándor Imre
We have also pointed out several interesting research issues 
for future work. First of all, it would be important to refine 
the convergence criteria for stopping the algorithm. At the 
time of writing this paper, using a memory of past mapping 
seems to be the best candidate to count truly new mappings 
for convergence. Furthermore, it should be investigated why 
we observed differences in recall between Epinions and others 
networks. This could also help us in improving Grasshopper 
to achieve even higher recall rates when the overlap is higher.
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